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Three methods of forecasting currency crises: 
Which made the run in signaling the South African 
currency crisis of June 2006? 
Abstract 
In this paper we test the ability of three of the most popular methods to forecast the 
South African currency crisis of June 2006. In particular we are interested in the out-of-
sample performance of these methods. Thus, we choose the latest crisis to conduct an 
out-of-sample experiment. In sum, the signals approach was not able to forecast the out-
of-sample crisis of correctly; the probit approach was able to predict the crisis but just 
with models, that were based on raw data. Employing a Markov-regime-switching ap-
proach also allows to predict the out-of-sample crisis. The answer to the question of 
which method made the run in forecasting the June 2006 currency crisis is: the Markov-
switching approach, since it called most of the pre-crisis periods correctly. However, the 
“victory” is not straightforward. In-sample, the probit models perform remarkably well 
and it is also able to detect, at least to some extent, out-of-sample currency crises before 
their occurrence. It can, therefore, not be recommended to focus on one approach only 
when evaluating the risk for currency crises. 
 
Key words: Currency crises, forecast, predictability, signals approach, Probit approach, 
Markov regime switching approach, South Arica 
JEL: C14, C22, C53, E47, F31, F37  
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Three methods of forecasting currency crises: 
Which made the run in signaling the South African 
currency crisis of June 2006? 
Zusammenfassung 
In diesem Beitrag wird die Prognosefähigkeit von drei populären Ansätzen anhand der 
südafrikanischen Währungskrise im Juni 2006 getestet. Von besonderem Interesse ist 
die Out-of-sample-Prognosegüte der Methoden. Deshalb wird die jüngste Währungs-
krise in Südafrika als Out-of-sample-Experiment genutzt. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass 
der  Signalansatz  nicht  in  der  Lage  war  die  Währungskrise  vorherzusagen;  Probit-
Ansätze konnten die Krise vorhersagen wenn sie auf Rohdaten und nicht auf Signalen 
des Signalansatzes basierten. Auch die Verwendung eines Markov-regime-switching-
Ansatz führte zu korrenkten Prognosen der Out-of-sample-Krise. Die Antwort auf die 
Titelfrage  des  Beitrags,  welche  Methode  die  Krise  vom  Juni  2006  am  besten 
vorhersagen konnte ist: der Markov-regime-switching-Ansatz, weil dieser die meisten 
Vorkrisenperioden korrekt erkannte. Dennoch ist der „Sieg“ nicht überragend. So ist die 
In-sample-Prognosegüte des Probit-Ansatzes besser und dieser Ansatz ist auch in der 
Lage zumindest einige der Vorkrisenperioden als solche zu erkennen. Es kann daher 
nicht empfohlen werden Währungskrisenprognosen auf nur einen Ansatz zu stützen. 
 
Schlagworte:  Währungskrisen,  Prognose,  Prognosegüte,  Signalansatz,  Probit-Ansatz, 
Markov-regime-switching-Ansatz, Südafrika 
JEL: C14, C22, C53, E47, F31, F37 
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Three methods of forecasting currency crises: 
Which made the run in signaling the South African 
currency crisis of June 2006?1 
1  Introduction 
Forecasting currency crises is a difficult, if not impossible task. However, the challenge 
to predict crises always inspired economists and econometricians. The list of methods to 
forecast currency crises is accordingly long. In this paper we test the ability of three of 
the most popular methods to forecast the South African currency crisis. In particular we 
are interested in the out-of-sample performance of these methods. Thus, we choose the 
latest crisis in 2006 to conduct an out-of-sample experiment. Whilst the literature knows 
meta-studies that compare the performance of different approaches2 there are only few 
studies, which compare the out-of-sample performance of the different approaches with 
one data set.3 
The South African economy is characterized by volatile foreign exchange market condi-
tions. The volatility appears thereby in frequent cycles of currency crises. Examples of 
current currency crises in South Africa include the crises of 1996, 1998, 2001 and now 
June 2006. While the exchange rate regime changed over the period since the democ-
ratic changes in South Africa in 1994, the appearance of currency crises seems to per-
sist. That is why the South African case is of particular interest. The high frequency of 
currency crises allows for calibrating forecasting models based on South African experi-
ences. Thus, the analysis does not depend on data from other countries. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces to the signals ap-
proach, the probit approaches and the Markov-regime-switching approach as methods of 
forecasting currency crises. In Section 3 the methods are employed to forecast South 
African currency crises. Section 4 compares the performance of the three approaches 
and section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
1  The authors are thankful to Abdul Abiad for providing his program code to run Markov-switching 
models in Eviews. 
2  E.g. Abiad (2003). 
3  Notable exceptions are Berg and Pattillo (1999), and Berg, Borensztein and Pattillo (2004). But 
there are no out-of-sample model comparisons so far, that include a Markov-switching approach.  
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2  Three methods of forecasting currency crises 
The theoretical literature on currency crises is centered on the paradigm of the three 
generations of currency crisis models. The first generation, owed to Krugman (1979), 
and Flood and Garber (1984), described currency crises as speculative attacks, which re-
sult from monetary or fiscal policies that were not in line with a fixed exchange rate tar-
get. The run on foreign currency reserves occurred because market participants could 
foresee the depreciation and tried to avoid losses. The models described the currency 
crises  of  the  1970s  and  1980s  in  Latin  America.  The  second  generation,  based  on 
Obstfeld (1986), stresses the trade-off between the central banks intentions to target a 
fixed exchange rate and to follow other policy targets, e.g. to achieve low levels of un-
employment. If speculators assume that the policy response could be devaluation, the 
event may become self-fulfilling without (in contrast to first generation models) wors-
ening  economic  fundamentals.  The  models  addressed,  for  example,  the  European 
Monetary System’s crisis in 1992. Third generation models stress the connection be-
tween banking and currency crises, and address problems such as contagion of crises 
and  herd  effects.  These  models  were  developed  in  response  to  the  Asian  crisis  of 
1997/1998. 
The empirical literature on signaling or forecasting currency crises is based on the theo-
retical transmission processes described above, but approaches vary with regard to the 
employed techniques. Standard approaches are binary logit/probit-models, signals ap-
proaches as developed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996, 1998) and Markov-switching 
approaches.4 Signals approaches are non-parametric approaches that examine the behav-
ior of potential explanatory variables prior to the detected crises and compare it with 
non-crisis periods. If some of the variables pass a certain threshold their changes are 
used as crisis signals.5 Logit/probit-models use the binary variable crisis/no crisis as en-
dogenous variable and estimate the impact of different sets of explanatory variables.6 
Markov-switching approaches do not depend on an a priori definition of crises. Besides 
these three techniques, further concepts are outlined in the literature.7 
                                                 
4  See Abiad (2003, p. 3). For a more detailed survey on Early-Warning Systems presented in this sec-
tion see Abiad (2003).  
5  See Brüggemann and Linne (2002). Other examples include Berg and Pattillo (1999), and Edison 
(2000). 
6  Examples include Berg and Pattillo (1999); Kamin, Schindler and Samuel (2001); Kumar, Moorthy 
and Perraudin (2002). 
7  These  include  artificial  neural  networks  (ANN),  whose  advantage  is  the  reflection  of  complex 
interaction between the variables (e.g. Nag and Mitra (1999); Peltonen (2006)); value-at-risk mod-
els, exposing several factors of risk to the ability of central banks to target a fixed exchange rate (e.g. 
Blejer and Schumacher (1998)); and restricted VAR models (e.g. Krkoska (2001)).  
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Signals  approaches  as  well  as  probit  approaches  often  base  model  parameter 
calculations on panel data.8 This has the advantage, that the models can be employed to 
predict  currency  crises  in  countries  with  no  or  rare  history  of  currency  crises.9  The 
disadvantage of a panel approach is that country specifics might be neglected. Thus, if a 
history of country specific currency crises is applicable, a single country approach is 
preferable.10 In the case of South Africa, country specific indicators might dominate 
since the economy is not imbedded in a cluster of similar economies and shows special 
characteristics, e.g. the exceptional importance of gold and platinum prices.11 The high 
number of currency crises in South Africa allows for a country specific approach. 
2.1  The Signals approach 
This paper largely follows the signals approach as developed by Brüggemann and Linne 
(2002), which is generally based upon Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996, 1998). The signals 
approach is used, because of its simple applicability and because it was found to outper-
form alternatives such as bond spreads and credit ratings.12 
The first step in employing a signals approach is to define currency crises that occurred 
in the period of observation. This is done by the use of the Exchange Market Pressure 
index as outlined in section 3. The second step is to identify potential explanatory vari-
ables, which may send signals for currency crises. These variables should be derived 
from theories about currency crises.13 The third step is to generate appropriate time se-
ries, as well as to decide on a sample period and data frequency. The fourth step is to 
decide on the crisis window, i.e. the time prior to a crisis in which the variables are ex-
pected to send their signals. The literature uses different sample periods and data fre-
quencies; most common are sample periods starting in the 1980s or 1990s and monthly 
data frequency.14 The time-window spans from 18 months to 24 months.15 In this paper 
we use an 18-months crisis window and a 12-month crisis window. The later is included 
to  allow  for  comparison with  other  approaches, which usually employ shorter crisis 
windows. 
                                                 
8   E.g. Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). 
9   See Brüggemann and Linne (2002: 8, 14-15). 
10   E.g. Abiad (2003, p. 45), Kittelmann et al. (2006). 
11   Compare section 3. 
12  Abiad (2003, p. 3). 
13  Variables, which may have an influence on the occurrence of currency crises in South Africa, are 
identified in section 3. 
14  Abiad (2003, p. 9). 
15  See for example Brüggemann and Linne (2002, p. 9) and Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998, 
p. 17) respectively.  
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The fifth step is to calculate individual crisis thresholds for each variable, which cuts 
tranquil periods from crisis periods. The difficulty lies in the problem that the threshold 
should neither be too high (and probably not detecting crises) nor too low (and probably 











.  (1) 
Whereby A is the number of months a good signal was sent (a crisis is correctly sig-
naled), B is the number of months a false alarm signal was sent, C is the number of 
months in which no signal was sent but a crisis followed, D is the number of months in 
which no signal was sent and no crisis followed. In other words, the noise-to-signal ratio 
is the ratio between false alarms as part of non-crisis followed months and good signals 
as part of crisis followed months. The noise-to-signal ratio is calculated with different 
crisis thresholds ranging from 5 to 30 percent or 70 to 95 percent of the distribution, de-
pending on the expected impact of the variable, for each measure. The thresholds yield-
ing the best-fit or lowest noise-to-signal ratios are used in the further calculation of the 
signals approach. Indicators that produce more false alarms than good signals, i.e. those 
having a noise-to-signal ratio of above one, are excluded from further analysis. 
The sixth step is the calculation of a composite indicator. Following Brüggemann and 
Linne (2002) the signals approach is extended by introducing a second threshold in or-
der to discriminate weak from strong signals, and by considering the timing of a signal 
(i.e. more current signals are higher weighted in the composite indicator). The weighting 
of the single indicators according to their prognostic quality is in line with standard lit-
erature. 
The calculation is conducted by first calculating the second threshold, which is done by 
halving the percentile of the frequency distribution which was calculated for the first 
threshold. If a single indicator remains below its first threshold it takes the value of zero, 
if it passes the first threshold its value is defined as one, if it passes the second threshold 














I for T I T
I T
 <
 = £ < 
 ³ 
;  1,..., . j k =   (2) 
Second,  a  moving  12-  or  18-months  window  is  calculated,  depending  on  the  time-
window defined before, to calculate geometrically weighted signal of each indicator: 
                                                 
16  See Brüggemann and Linne (2002, p. 10).  
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Third, these so-calculated Z-signals of each variable are combined by accounting for 
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The procedure yields a composite indicator of currency crises. 
While the composite indicator itself can be used to observe changes in the intensity of 
currency crisis signals, the level of the index cannot be interpreted. Thus, it is not possi-
ble to draw inferences on the probability of currency crises from the index. Therefore, 
following Brüggemann and Linne (2002), and Edison (2000) conditional probabilities 
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.  (5) 
For each arbitrarily chosen interval between a lower and an upper limit the conditional 
probability can be calculated. This conditional probability is the probability of a crisis 
occurring within 12- or 18-months under the condition that the indicator ranges between 
the lower and the upper band. While the calculated probability is explicitly not the prob-
ability of the occurrence of future crises, it is used to signal the risk for currency crises. 
2.2  Logit/Probit approaches 
Another set of methods employs probit or logit estimation models. The common char-
acteristic of all of these methods is that the limited dependent variable takes a value of 
zero in non-crisis or tranquil periods, while it takes a value of one in crisis periods and 
in differently defined “window” periods before a crisis. In general the probit models 
take the form of:17 
1 t t t Pr( y x ) ( x ' ) b = = F .  (6) 
The method developed by Berg and Pattillo (1999) uses the signals approach as a start-
ing point. The authors use the signals sent by individual indicators (compare equation 
(5) although the Berg & Pattillo use just one threshold) as independent variables. Their 
                                                 
17  Compare e.g. Wooldridge (2001, chapter 15).  
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panel data analysis and the performance test of the methods shows, that the probit ap-
proach has advantages over the signals approach regarding the predictability of currency 
crises. In the course of their paper they vary the method and also use percentiles of the 
distribution of the independent variables as well as the slope below the crisis thresholds, 
the leap at the threshold and the slope above the threshold as variations of the independ-
ent variables.18 The Berg & Pattillo approach is element of the Developing Country 
Studies Division model, which is used by the International Monetary Fund.19 In this pa-
per we reproduce the approach of Berg and Pattillo, using the individual indicator sig-
nals as independent variables. However, we extend the approach by the use of second 
thresholds and we use a 12- and an 18-months crisis window. 
A second option of dealing with the independent variables is not to include the calcu-
lated signals but the data itself as it is done in Frankel and Rose (1996). The advantage 
of using the original data might be that the loss of information due to the transformation 
of the data can be avoided. We therefore also employ the Frankel and Rose approach to 
forecast the South African currency crisis of 2006.20 
One problem with the signals approach and the probit approach is that in the current pe-
riod we cannot know, whether a crisis as defined by the EMP index follows or not. The 
same counts for the past periods that lay within the crisis window. Therefore, to cali-
brate our forecasting model we can only use data from before the window period. Thus, 
for the out of sample forecasts of the crisis in June 2006, we can only use data up to No-
vember 2004 (in the 18-months crisis window case) for model calibration. The depend-
ency on a specific crisis definition and on a crisis window is overcome by the use of 
Markov-switching models. 
2.3  Markov-switching models 
Models of regime switching have a long history in empirical macroeconomic research.21 
Especially Hamilton’s (1989) state-dependent Markov-switching model has become a 
useful tool in describing time series, which undergo different episodes, while their char-
acter changes quite dramatically. In contrast to earlier work we follow Diebold, Lee and 
Weinbach (1994), and Filardo (1994) in allowing for time-varying crisis probabilities – 
assuming that the probability of switching may depend on some underlying economic 
fundamentals. 
                                                 
18  See Berg and Pattillo (1999, pp. 572-574). 
19  See IMF and World Bank (2005, p. 37). 
20  Several  studies  have  reproduced,  modified  and  extended  the  above-described  approaches.  One 
interesting modification is to focus the dependent variable on crisis periods only and include a lag 
structure on the right hand side of the estimation equation. 
21  See for example Quandt (1958); Goldfeld and Quandt (1973).  
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The Markov-switching approach to signal currency crises has a number of advantages 
compared to its competitors. First, it is not necessary to define crisis episodes. Instead, 
the identification procedure is done simultaneously with the crisis forecast probability. 
In doing so, one avoids problems with the potentially arbitrary dating of crises. Second, 
we can use more information by examining the Exchange Market Pressure Index di-
rectly instead of transforming it into a binary variable. Thus, the dynamics (including the 
volatility)  may  be  also  important  in  explaining  future  crises.  Finally,  the  Markov-
switching model provides concrete crisis probabilities for the following periods (which 
is a common feature of both probit/logit models and Markov-switching models). 
The assumptions underlying the Markov approach can be shortly summarized. We as-
sume two different states (or regimes): tranquil periods and crisis periods. We cannot di-
rectly observe these states. It can be seen as a latent variable  t s  that is equal to 0 if we 
are in the tranquil state and equal to 1 if we are in a crisis period. Additionally, we have 
a  direct  observable  variable  t y   –  the  Exchange  Market  Pressure  Index  –  whose 
characteristics change depending on the underlying state. This variable depends on  t s as 
follows: 
2 | ~ ( , )
t t
iid
t t s s y s N m s   (7) 
Thus, the data generating process for t y varies with the state  t s  and differs in respect to 
its mean 
t s m and variance
2
t s s . For example, we expect higher average depreciations and 
higher exchange rate volatility during the crisis state (which will also lead to a higher 
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  (8) 
Finally, given the actual state, the probability of staying in the same state or moving to 
the other state depends on variables describing the country’s fundamental condition. So 
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  (9) 
where 
ij
t p  is the probability of moving from state i in period t-1 to state j in period t. In 
our case we assume logistic forms of the transition probabilities in the following way:  
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The (kx1)-vector  1 t x -  includes the early-warning indicators which may affect the transi-
tion probabilities through the (kx1) parameter vectors 0 b  or  1 b  which can have different 
constants across the states. 
From  this  setting  a  natural  step  would  be  to  estimate  the  parameters 




1 , s 0 b and  1 b  by maximum likelihood. But there is some practical difficulty 
concerning this procedure: the complete-data log likelihood cannot be constructed, be-
cause the complete data are not observed. Therefore we follow Hamiliton (1989) for the 
case of constant transition probabilities and Diebold, Lee and Weinbach (1994) with 
time-varying transition probabilities and use the EM (“expectation” – “maximization”) 
algorithm for maximization of the incomplete-data likelihood.22 
The  Markov-switching  model  estimates  one-month  ahead  forecast  probabilities.  To 
make these probabilities comparable to other early warning systems one can transform 
them into long-horizon crisis probabilities, using23: 
Pr(crisis over next n months) = 1-Pr(no crisis over next n months) 
  = 1-Pr(no crisis over next 1month)
n 
  = 1-(1-Pr(crisis over next 1month))
n 
In most applications it has become standard to define a binary “alarm signal” which is 
equal to 1 if the crisis probability exceeds a general threshold, and 0 otherwise. We set 
this  threshold  inline  with  other  studies  equal  to  50%.24  Thus,  whenever  the  crisis 
probability  lies  above  this  number  our  model  forecasts  a  crisis  during  the  next  12-
month. 
                                                 
22  Details about the EM algorithm can be found in Hamilton (1994, pp. 692-695) and Diebold, Lee and 
Weinbach (1994, sec. 3).  
23  It is assumed that the indicators that influence the crises probability neither worsen nor improve dur-
ing that period. 
24  Berg and Pattillo (1999)  
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3  Currency crisis forecasts for South Africa 
Now we use the above-described techniques to show to what extend these methods are 
able to detect currency crises in South Africa. First, we look at their in-sample fit to 
evaluate the model specific forecasting performance for the sample period from 1995 to 
December 2004 and June 2005 for the 18-month and the 12-month time window case 
respectively. Second, we do an out-of-sample experiment where we employ forecasts for 
the risk of currency crises until the advent of the June 2006 currency crisis. Since it is 
well known from recent forecasting literature that good in-sample forecasting perform-
ance does not necessarily translate into good out-of-sample forecasts.25 Due to the fact 
that currency crises occur very infrequently we can only use one crisis for the forecast-
ing exercise. So these results should be interpreted with caution. 
To identify currency crises we use the standard definition of the Exchange Market Pres-
sure Index (EMP).26 The index mirrors changes in exchange rates, interest rates and cur-
rency reserves. A depreciation, an increase in interest rates, as well as shrinking reserves 
increase the index. A higher index indicates, therefore, higher pressure on foreign ex-
change markets. It not only detects crises that show up in large depreciations but also 
crises that caused policy reactions but did not lead to significant depreciations of the ex-
change rate. The three components of the EMP are weighted according to their inverse 
standard deviation. If the index exceeds a certain bound, the event is called a currency 
crisis. The standard bound is an increase of the index of above the mean of the index 
time series plus 1.645 times the standard deviation.27 The use of this threshold identifies 
five percent of the periods as crisis periods, if the time series is normally distributed. 
Figure 1 shows the development of the Exchange Market Pressure and currency crises in 
South Africa. Taking a closer look at the sub-components of the index shows, that the 
depreciation is the only component that shows extra-ordinary changes in June 2006. 
This indicates that monetary policy – in line with the policy of floating exchange rates – 
did not significantly react to the crisis. This makes the crisis different from currency cri-
ses of the 1990s, where the Reserve Bank intervened in foreign exchange markets and 
increased interest rates. Taking this change in policy into account, it might be difficult 
for all methods to correctly predict the currency crisis of June 2006. 
                                                 
25  See e.g. Clements and Hendry (2001) for a general discussion as well as Berg, Borensztein and Pat-
tillo  (2004)  who  emphasize  the  importance  of  out-of-sample  prediction  performance  for  early-
warning-system models of currency crises. 
26  See Bhundia and Ricci (2005, p. 157), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996, p. 4), Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1996, pp. 474-475). For a discussion of different EMP measures for South Africa see 
Knedlik (2006). 
27  See e.g. Bhundia and Ricci (2005).  
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Figure 1: 
Currency crises identified by the Exchange Market Pressure Index 
Source:  own calculations. Note: The figure presents current values of the EMP index for each period. If 
the confidence interval, marked with the lines below the dots, lays completely above the zero 
line, the period is called a crisis month, also full dots indicate crisis months. 
A set of variables in the style of those that have been found to be useful in signaling cur-
rency crises in previous studies as extracted by Brüggemann and Linne (2002) are used. 
These variables include: (1) growth of industrial production, (2) the ratio of budget defi-
cits to GDP, (3) the appreciation of the real exchange rate, (4) the change in the interna-
tional liquidity position, (5) growth rate of merchandise exports, (6) growth rate of mer-
chandise imports, (7) growth rate of ratio of domestic credit to GDP, (8) the growth rate 
of the ratio of M2 to currency reserves, (9) the domestic interest rate, (10) the interest 
rate differential to the US, (11) growth rate of bank deposits of individuals, (12) growth 
rate of foreign debt of the government, (13) the ratio of lending rates to deposit rates. 
The Commission of Inquiry into the rapid depreciation of the exchange rate of the rand 
and related matters, the so-called Myburgh Commission (2002), was officially estab-
lished to investigate the 2001 currency crisis in South Africa. The commissions report 
indicates variables, which may contribute to the explanation of currency crises in South 
Africa. Some of them are already included in standard set of variables, such as the open 
forward position of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), which is reflected in the 
international liquidity position. Additionally, from this report variable (14), the inflation 
differential to the US is included. Other “weak” factors found to explain part of the 2001 
depreciation, such as privatizations and negative sentiments could not be included due 
to a lack of computable data. Additionally, another factor mentioned in the literature as 
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is included.28 Whilst the variables were derived from considering the theory of currency 
crises is not always possible to indicate which generation of currency crisis models is 
addressed by a specific indicator. Most variables play important roles in more then one 
currency  crisis  model.  A typical indicator for currency crises of the first generation 
would be (12) the growth rate of foreign debt of the government. A variable derived 
from second generation models would be (14) the inflation differential to the US, indi-
cating that exchange rate developments might be in conflict with other policy targets, 
e.g. inflation. Typical for third generation models are indicators related to the banking 
sector such as (10) the interest differential to the US and (13) the ratio of lending to de-
posit rates. The metric signs of all variables are adjusted, so that a positive change of 
any variable indicates a higher risk for currency crisis. All data for all approaches is 
taken or derived from SARB online statistics. 
3.1  The Signals approach 
The signals approach is employed as described above. In the 18-month case there are 
seven indicators which send more good then bad signals and are, therefore, included in 
the calculation. These variables are: the ratio of budget deficits to GDP, the change in 
the international liquidity position, growth rate of merchandise imports, growth rate of 
ratio of domestic credit to GDP, the domestic interest rate, and the change of the price of 
gold. The calculation of conditional probabilities yields figures as reported in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 shows that there are high (in sample) indications for currency crises in the peri-
ods before the 1996 and the 1998 crises. However, there are rare indications of the cur-
rency crises of 2001 (in sample) and 2006 (out of sample). There also seems to be some 
false alarms in late 2003 and early 2004 (in sample). 
The figure looks worse when considering a 12-month crisis window only. The results of 
the calculations of the signal approach are reported in Figure 3. The calculation of this 
version of the signals approach uses six time series for the calibration of the model: 
growth of industrial production, the ratio of budget deficits to GDP, the domestic inter-
est rate, growth rate of foreign debt of the government, the ratio of lending rates to de-
posit rates, and the change of the price of gold. 
The figure only shows correct predictions of the 1998 crisis. In all other crisis cases no 
strong signal was sent. That includes the period prior the 2006 crisis, where the signal 
approach shows the lowest risk of the whole sample. 
                                                 
28  E.g. Aron and Muellbauer (2005, p. 30).  
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Figure 2: 
Conditional probabilities for currency crises in South Africa using an 18-months crisis 
window signals approach 
Source:  own calculations. Note: The gray columns indicate crisis months, the bold black line/dots indi-
cate that alarm signals were sent, the dashed line is the current crisis probability in the respective 
periods, the gray shaded area indicates the out-of-sample period 
Figure 3: 
Conditional probabilities for currency crises in South Africa using a 12-months crisis 
window signals approach 
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For both versions of the signals approach counts, and that was to test for here, the crisis 
of June 2006 could not have been anticipated relying on a signals approach as early 
warning system for currency crises. The next section asks whether or not the probit ap-
proach is doing any better. 
3.2  Logit/Probit approaches 
We first conduct a probit approach that uses the signal variables of the signals approach 
as independent variables and an 12-months crisis window as binary independent vari-
able, i.e. the dependent variable takes the value of one in crisis months and up to twelve 
months prior a crisis and takes the value of zero in all other months. Data up to May 
2005 is used to calibrate the model. Then forecasts of currency crisis probability for the 
whole sample, up to May 2006 were run. The results of the estimation are shown in the 
column “Based on signals” in Table 1 and the forecasts are presented in Figure 4. 
Table 1: 
Probit estimations 
  Based on signals 
(12-months window) 
Based on raw data 
(12-months window) 
Based on raw data 
(18-months window) 
Indicator  Coeff.  z-stat.  Coeff.  z-stat.  Coeff.  z-stat. 
Constant  0.77  -4.43  -13.26  -4.87  -6.14  -3.87 
Budget deficits  0.02  0.05  -  -  -  - 
Dom. Interest rate  0.67  2.97  0.53  3.97  -  - 
Foreign debt  -0.02  -0.09  -  -  -2.75  -3.20 
Gold price  1.64  3.55  -  -  -  - 
Industrial prod.  -0.02  -0.09  -  -  -  - 
Lend./deposit rates  -0.22  -0.87  -  -  -  - 
Credit/GDP  -  -  -  -  -34.98  -3.07 
Bank deposits  -  -  -49.80  -4.69  -51.89  -4.70 
Exports  -  -  -16.24  -3.25  -  - 
M2  -  -  -9.80  -4.17  -4.22  -3.28 
Inflation differential  -  -  0.28  2.01  -  - 
Inter. liq. position  -  -  -0.0001  -2.19  0.0001  2.38 
Dom. interest rate  -  -  -  -  1.70  3.96 
Interest differential  -  -  -  -  -1.87  -4.10 
Imports  -  -  -  -  13.11  3.79 
Number of obs.  137  137  131 
LR-Test joint sign.  31.12  133.74  132.30 
p-Value  0.00  0.00  0.00 
McFadden Rˆ2  0.18  0.78  0.73 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Figure 4: 
Probit forecasts (12-months crisis window, model based on signals) 
Source: own calculations. 
For the forecasting purpose the estimation model is reduced by insignificant variables so 
that only domestic interest rates and the gold price, besides the constant, are left. While 
the pure use of the signals approach in the 12-months window case could only signal the 
1998 crisis, the probit approach, using the same data, shows an impressive improvement 
of in-sample predictability of currency crises. The figure shows stronger signals prior 
the 1996 and 2001 crises. However, the crisis probability prior the 2006 crisis is not 
above the critical value of 50 percent. The use of an 18-months crisis window yields 
similar and also better results as compared with the 18-months signals approach.29 
The next approach is to estimate probit estimations that use the original data instead of 
signal variables as right-hand side variables. We include all variables that contribute 
significantly to the statistical explanation. The probit model is again calculated for the 
12 and the 18-months crisis window. 
In the 12-months case the final model includes seven variables: a constant term, the 
change in the international liquidity position, growth rate of merchandise exports, the 
growth rate of the ratio of M2 to currency reserves, the domestic interest rate, the inter-
est rate differential to the US, growth rate of bank deposits of individuals, the inflation 
differential to the US (see column “Based on raw data (12-months window)” in Table 1). 
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Figure 5 reports the forecast results of the 12-months crisis window probit model. The 
model predicts all currency crises (in sample and out-of-sample) correctly and does only 
limited set off false alarms. 
Figure 5: 
Probit forecasts (12-months crisis window, model based on raw data) 
Source:  own calculations. 
With a longer crisis window of 18 months nine variables become significant: a constant 
term, the change in the international liquidity position, growth rate of merchandise im-
ports, growth rate of ratio of domestic credit to GDP, the domestic interest rate, the in-
terest rate differential to the US, growth rate of bank deposits of individuals, growth rate 
of foreign debt of the government (see Figure 6 and column “18-months window” in 
Table 1). The model with the longer crisis window performs better with regard to out-
of-sample forecasts. 
The results of the probit analysis of currency crisis forecasts leads to the conclusion that 
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Figure 6: 
Probit forecast (18-months crisis window, model based on raw data) 
Source:  own calculations. 
3.3  Markov-Switching Approach 
To  make  our  Markov-Switching  model  as  comparable  as  possible  to  our  other  ap-
proaches we consider all early warning indicators from the signal approach. In the first 
step we follow Abiad (2003) and estimate bivariate models where we try to extract im-
portant variables that influence the transition probability. Each indicator together with a 
constant is included one by one into the regression and is evaluated by its significance 
level. Of course, we are aware that this step-by-step approach may be misleading when 
the exogenous variables are correlated. But we will test our final model of joint signifi-
cance of our selected indicators and can thus evaluate if the variables are of common 
importance.30 
We estimate the model with a sample period from 1995:01 to 2005:05. Due to possible 
problems with convergence in the maximum likelihood estimation we rescale each indi-
cator to be mean zero and unit variance. Since we defined our variables in such a way 
that a positive sign of the variable lead to an increase in the probability moving into the 
crisis state, we expect only positive signs for our indicators. For South Africa we found 
                                                 
30  This is not a substitute for a test of omitted variables. Such a test is not feasible in our setting because 
it is not possible to run the model with all variables together due to problems in the convergence of 
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only the growth rate of bank deposits of individuals and the change of the international 
liquidity position to be important early warning indicators.31 
These two indicators enter into our final multivariate model. Table 2 shows the results 
of this model specification. The tranquil state (st = 0) is identified with low mean and 
low volatility whereas state 1 is a high-mean and high-volatility regime. These differ-
ences are both significant. Our two early warning indicators show no significant coeffi-
cient itself, but they are correctly signed and the joint test is highly significant. 
Table 2: 
Estimation of the Markov-switching model 
Indicator  Coeff.  t-stat. 
Mean (State 0)  -0.70  -5.05 
Mean (State 1)  2.40  2.41 
Sigma (State 0)  1.42  13.18 
Sigma (State 1)  3.84  5.30 
     
International liquidity position, difference  5.42  0.71 
Bank deposits of individuals, growth rate  1.87  0.78 
Constant (State 0)  6.20  0.86 
Constant (State 1)  0.81  1.61 
Number of observations 





Source:  Own estimations. 
If one examines the crisis dates determined by the Markov-switching model we find the 
first and longest crisis period in South Africa during December 1995 until December 
1996  (with  exception of the September). Interestingly, this model identifies a much 
longer crisis time span as compared to the signal approach where the crisis is dated only 
in April and May 1996. The next crisis begins in May 1998, which is totally in line with 
the signal approach. But again the Markov model identifies a longer crisis period (until 
October instead of August). The last dated crisis in December 2001 is exactly the same 
as with the signal approach. 
 
                                                 
31  We evaluate significance with a Likelihood-ratio test. The regression results from the first step are 
available from the authors on request.  
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Figure 7: 
Markov-switching Forecast 
Source: Own calculations. 
Before the first crisis, the model did not send any alarm signal and thus could not fore-
cast the crisis event a priori. But after the first crisis month the model started to send 
signals and anticipated the following episodes correctly. In contrast to the first crisis, the 
second one was predicted before the event arose (namely two months before). The same 
holds true for the last crisis in our sample. In this case the alarm signal was sent as of 
July 2001 and the crisis occurred in December. The situation is only slightly different 
when the EMP crisis definition is employed. Here, the model sends alarm signals prior 
each crisis. But another important feature of the Markov-switching approach is that it 
still sends alarms signals straight after a crisis occurred. This characteristic leads to 
some false alarms. 
More interestingly is the out-of-sample predictive ability of our model. Since we know 
that in June 2006 there will be a crisis, we could like to investigate the properties of the 
model before this crisis will arise. Figure 8 indicates a rising crisis probability already in 
2005. The model sends alarm signals from June until November 2005 and again from 
April 2006 onwards. Clearly the model anticipates our crisis of interest in June 2006. 
Therefore we can conclude that the Markov-switching approach is able to detect the up-
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4  Comparing the forecast performance of the three 
approaches 
The in-sample and out-of-sample performance of our models concerning its forecasting 
properties is summarized by several goodness-of-fit measures. Table 3 gives a flavor of 
these indicators. 
Table 3: 
Forecasting  performance  of  different  approaches  (all  based  on  12-months  crisis 
window) 
Goodness-of-fit 
(cut-off-prob. of 50%) 
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Source:  Own calculations. 
The last row of Table 3 provides a measure for the out-of-sample performance of the 
methods, while all other rows of the table provide measures of in-sample performance. 
The probit approach based on raw data forecasts the most in-sample crises correctly. 
The probit approach based on signals yields the lowest figure of false alarms. While the 
signals approach provides the best figure in forecasting tranquil periods, it is outper-
formed by the probit approach (based on raw data, 12 months) with regard to all obser-
vation that are correctly called. The comparability of the signals and probit approaches 
with the Markov approach is somewhat hampered by the fact that different crisis detec-
tion methods are used and subsequently different crisis dates are identified. Therefore, 
the last column of Table 3 shows the performance of the Markov approach when EMP  
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crisis definition is used. The only methods with correct out-of-sample forecasts are the 
Markov-switching approach and the probit approach based on raw data. 
Other criteria to be considered when applying early warning systems would be the sim-
plicity of the method, where the signals approach has an advantage. However, since 
probit  and  Markov-switching  models  can  now  also  be  run  by  standard  econometric 
software this advantage is narrowing. Another criterion would be the arbitrariness of the 
definition of currency crises. This problem is often discussed with regard to the EMP 
index. Here the Markov-switching approach has the advantage of a synchronous identi-
fication of crisis periods and the calculation of current risk of currency crises.  
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5  Conclusions 
In this paper we compared three popular methods of forecasting currency crises in South 
Africa. Our emphasis was on the out-of-sample performance of these models, because 
we think that this is of primary importance in assessing the actual risk of a currency 
crisis. 
In sum, the signals approach was not able to forecast the out-of-sample crisis of June 
2006 correctly; the probit approach was able to predict the crisis but just with models, 
that were based on raw data. Employing a Markov-regime-switching approach also al-
lows to predict the out-of-sample crisis. The answer to the question of which method 
made the run in forecasting the June 2006 currency crisis is: the Markov-switching ap-
proach, since it called most of the pre-crisis periods correctly. However, the “victory” is 
not straightforward. In-sample, the probit models perform remarkably well and it is also 
able to detect, at least to some extent, out-of-sample currency crises before their occur-
rence. It can, therefore, not be recommended to focus on one approach only when evalu-
ating the risk for currency crises. Further research is needed to validate our results.  
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